

INCIDENT DOSSIER · UKRAINE / POLAND FRONTIER

Yahodyn

The train strike at Europe’s border



13 September 2026: a locomotive hit, passengers evacuated, and a disputed inference about the intended target.

Open-source investigation · Research cut-off 15 September 2026 · Edition 1.3



Plate 01. Yahodyn, 13 September. Ukrzaliznytsia Railway Company Press Office via AP; published by ABC News. [03]

Principal finding

The strike on a passenger-train locomotive is well corroborated. A railway executive confirmed it directly to a local broadcaster. Published aftermath imagery supports the account of physical damage. No train casualties were reported. [03] [05]

The allegation that visiting European officials were the intended target is more uncertain. The railway raised that possibility; the visitors’ diplomatic train had already departed. [04] [08]

Pistorius’s description of calculated escalation is a consequential political judgment. The Reuters dispatch does not disclose evidence of Putin personally selecting this target. [01] [02]


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LOCATION ATLAS / YAHODYN AND THE POLISH BORDER


Volyn, northwestern Ukraine. Distinct rail and road crossings link Yahodyn with Poland.

REGIONAL SETTING · EASTERN POLAND AND NORTHWESTERN UKRAINE



Map M1. The dashed frame locates the detailed view below within the Lublin–Chełm–Kovel border region.

LOCAL SETTING · ROAD CROSSING AND CROSS-BORDER RAILWAY



Map M2. A–C identify mapped transport facilities. They are reference locations, not verified impact points. Both crossings traverse the River Bug frontier.

A • Yahodyn station / B • Dorohusk station. These anchor the railway corridor. The railway placed the struck locomotive about two kilometres from Poland; that statement does not fix a particular track or establish the station building as the impact site. [05]

C • Yahodyn road checkpoint. Local reporting places the separate fuel-station and truck damage near the road crossing. The marker identifies the checkpoint, not the damaged petrol station. [09] [10]

Cartographic record. Maps retrieved 15 September 2026; current geographic context, not a reconstruction of conditions on the incident date. North is up. Web Mercator (EPSG:3857); scale bars show ground distance at their displayed latitude. Reference coordinates (WGS84, rounded): A 51.1982° N, 23.8950° E; B 51.1721° N, 23.7842° E; C 51.1895° N, 23.8128° E.

M1–M2 sources. Esri World Topographic Map, exported at 1,600 px width; basemap geography and colours retained. ISS Global added coordinate-based reference labels, scale bars and the detail frame. Point checks: Yahodyn station; Dorohusk station; road checkpoint.

Sources: Esri, HERE, Garmin, Intermap, increment P Corp., GEBCO, USGS, FAO, NPS, NRCAN, GeoBase, IGN, Kadaster NL, Ordnance Survey, Esri Japan, METI, Esri China (Hong Kong), © OpenStreetMap contributors, and the GIS User Community. © 2026 Esri and its licensors; used under [static-map licence](#). OpenStreetMap data: ODbL, openstreetmap.org/copyright.

01 / THREE TRAINS, TWO ATTACK SITES

The clearest account separates the struck locomotive, the visiting officials and the nearby road crossing.

The railway event

On the morning of Sunday 13 September, a drone struck the locomotive of a Kyiv–Warsaw passenger service near Yahodyn in Volyn, northwestern Ukraine. In a telephone interview, Ukrzaliznytsia deputy director Oleksandr Shevchenko confirmed the route, advance warning and absence of deaths or injuries. The operator placed the train about two kilometres from Poland. [05]

Le Monde reported 206 passengers, all unharmed. That figure describes the passenger service, not the size of the diplomatic delegation. [18]

SERVICE	PUBLIC ACCOUNT	WHAT FOLLOWS
Kyiv–Warsaw passenger train	Locomotive struck after warning and evacuation. [03] [05]	This is the damaged train in the incident account.
YES diplomatic train	Boris Johnson, Carl Bildt and other guests travelled on it. The organiser says it had reached Dorohusk in Poland. [07]	Presence on the route does not mean they were on the struck train.
Separate train with David Petraeus	The railway placed this train at Yahodyn during the attack. [07] [08]	It must not be merged with the Johnson/ Bildt train.

How the warning is described

The railway said its Central Monitoring Group detected the approaching drone and issued an evacuation signal approximately 15 minutes before impact. It also said the diplomatic service left earlier than scheduled under continually revised safety arrangements. These are operator statements; no timestamped dispatcher log was released in the material reviewed. [04]

A separate road event

The fuel-station and truck damage occurred in the road crossing’s service area. Local reporters interviewed customs and border officials about that site separately. An image of burning trucks cannot establish where the locomotive was hit. [09] [10]

Chronology limit. This investigation establishes a morning rail strike and an earlier reported roadside attack. It does not assign an exact impact minute or infer a single uninterrupted sequence from edited footage.

02 / THE VISIBLE RECORD AND THE MISSING OBJECT



Plate 02 · Published evacuation frame. LIGA.net credits this image to a United24 screenshot of the 13 September train attack. The source's blur is retained. It shows people beside carriages and distant smoke; it is not a close-up of the drone. [06]

What can be observed

Plate 01 shows torn locomotive panels, exposed internal spaces, darkened surfaces and smoke. Plate 02 shows people outside trains. These observations fit a disruptive railway incident, but neither photograph reveals a weapon’s serial number, warhead or flight-control equipment.

The reproductions do not supply camera originals, complete capture metadata or a chain of custody. Neither image alone establishes the nationality of the attacker or the identity of the intended passenger.

The reported device

Interfax’s Ukrainian account calls the weapon a jet-powered “mesh” drone. Suspilne also reports that description. The operator’s terminology is useful evidence of what it believed it detected, but it is not a published laboratory identification. [04] [07]

No specific model is established here. The report does not convert that description into an authenticated Geran or Shahed variant. General photographs of those families would be illustrative, not an image of this particular device.

REQUESTED OBJECT	EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO THIS REVIEW
Drone / airframe	No authenticated close-up of a recovered airframe linked to the locomotive strike was retrieved.
Payload / warhead	No attributable recovered-warhead image, explosive assay, charge mass or forensic exhibit inventory was retrieved.
Guidance and operator	No flight log, terminal video, control record or identified launch crew was available for examination.

Visual assessment is limited to the published reproductions. No enhancement, reconstructed weapon, invented payload illustration or inferred facial identification has been added.

03 / A NEIGHBOURING INCIDENT WITH ITS OWN EVIDENCE

“Near the border”, “at the crossing” and “on the train” refer to different places and consequences.

Evidence from the service area

Suspilne’s reporters described a crater in the road surface, burning vehicles and damage to nearby businesses. Their interviews included driver Ihor, who escaped his cab, and Dmytro Kravets, who described vehicle damage and scratches from fragments. The report placed the service-area impact roughly half a kilometre from the customs-control zone. [10]

A separate local report cited customs spokeswoman Valentyna Chernysh and border-guard spokeswoman Marharyta Vershynina. It reported that operations paused during the alert, that the crossing was functioning normally by 10:00, and that two drivers had suffered light injuries according to preliminary information from the correspondent. [09]

Why the geography matters

Interfax relayed the Ukrainian border service’s clarification that the checkpoint itself had not been hit. [04] This can coexist with damage in its surrounding service area. A border crossing is both a specific control facility and, in everyday reporting, a broader transport district.

STATEMENT	CORRECT SCOPE
No casualties reported on trains	Rail event and the trains discussed in the agency account. It is not a finding that nobody was hurt nearby. [03]
Two drivers lightly injured	Preliminary local reporting on the road-service area, not passengers in the locomotive strike. [09]
Checkpoint not directly hit	A distinction about the control facility; not a denial of the adjacent road attack. [04]
Close to Poland	Reported distances use different reference points. They should not be treated as survey measurements of one impact site.

What changed by the next day

On 14 September, district administration head Olha Cheren told Suspilne that the road crater had been filled. The report described continuing clean-up around a burned truck and damage to nearly 20 trucks in the 13 September roadside attack. Its wider list of property complaints covered several locations and two days. [11]

Assessment. The public record supports disruption on both rail and road approaches to the frontier. It does not, by itself, establish a shared launch crew, identical munitions or one coordinated targeting order for the two sites.

04 / ATTRIBUTION IS NOT ONE QUESTION

State responsibility, the selected target and an individual’s role require different evidence.

The state attribution

Ukrainian officials identify the attacks as Russian. ISW’s source review also records the Russian defence ministry’s acknowledgement of strikes on western Ukrainian rail infrastructure, justified by Russia as serving military supplies arriving from Europe. That broad claim does not demonstrate the contents or military use of the particular passenger locomotive. [05] [12]

Asked about the train attack on 14 September, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Russian military operations throughout Ukraine would continue. NV and AP separately reported that response. It is neither a detailed account of this strike nor confirmation of an order to kill particular visitors. [13] [19]

PERSON / INSTITUTION	ROLE ESTABLISHED IN THE REVIEWED REPORTING
Vladimir Putin	Named by Pistorius in his assessment of Russian escalation. The Reuters report does not publish a personal targeting order. [01] [02]
Russian launch crew / unit	No individual operator, unit attribution or arrest linked specifically to this strike was established in the material reviewed.
Boris Johnson and Carl Bildt	Passengers on the diplomatic service, not identified perpetrators or passengers on the struck locomotive’s train. [07]
David Petraeus	On another train at Yahodyn according to Ukrzaliznytsia. His reported presence does not prove he was selected as a target. [07] [08]
Boris Pistorius	German defence minister giving a public assessment at Wolgast the following day. Plate 03 records that visit’s context. [02] [17]

Why there is no suspect portrait plate

No authenticated photograph of a named operator or accused planner for this incident was found. A generic portrait of a Russian leader would not fill that evidential gap. Photographs of threatened visitors or officials commenting on the strike belong to different categories.

The dossier reports allegations and official positions as such. It does not identify a criminal suspect from appearance, declare individual guilt or import personnel from the separate Leipzig investigation.

05 / COMPETING EXPLANATIONS

A plausible inference can matter greatly without being a demonstrated fact.

The strongest case for a diplomatic target

The railway’s account links the strike to a station recently used by a diplomatic service whose timetable had been changed for safety. That coincidence in route and timing gives the targeting hypothesis a factual basis. Ukrinform’s English account retains the operator’s conditional formulation. [08]

ISW goes further, assessing that the available reporting strongly supports an intended strike on serving or former European officials. Its assessment is based on public reporting; the document does not disclose an intercepted order, authenticated target list or drone mission file. [12]

EXPLANATION	FIT WITH THE PUBLIC RECORD	EVIDENCE NEEDED TO DISTINGUISH IT
Officials were the intended target	Consistent with their recent passage and the operator’s suspicion.	A tasking record, demonstrated knowledge of their travel, or reliable evidence linking the attack to that service.
Rail infrastructure was the intended target	A locomotive was actually hit; wider rail attacks are reported.	Mission records identifying the asset and the attacker’s assessment of its use.
Disrupt or intimidate border traffic	Fits damage to separate transport sites and the wider political effect.	Evidence of coordinated selection, timing and intended signalling.
Target confusion or a changed opportunity	Cannot be excluded by public images or a changed timetable.	A reliable account of what the attacker observed before impact.

The table is this investigation’s analysis. The explanations are not equally supported and need not be mutually exclusive. It presents tests of the claims, not findings about undisclosed Russian planning.

What “calculated escalation” establishes

On 14 September, Pistorius urged composure, readiness to defend and refusal to be intimidated. Reuters directly records his public position. [02] France’s Jean-Noël Barrot likewise characterised the strike as an attempt to frighten and divide Europeans. [14]

Assessment: the disruptive and intimidating effect is readily understandable from the location and the people using the route. The more specific claim of a deliberate assassination attempt requires evidence beyond the fact that a diplomatic train had recently passed. This review therefore treats it as a serious, unresolved hypothesis.

06 / HOW THE INCIDENT BECAME PUBLIC

Publication and update times are separated from the time of the underlying event.

DATE / TIME	REPORTING STAGE	WHAT ENTERED OR CHANGED IN THE PUBLIC ACCOUNT
13 Sep Morning event	Rail and road attacks	Local accounts describe the locomotive strike and the separate fuel-station / truck damage. Exact impact minutes are not established by this review. [05] [09]
13 Sep 10:00 status	Road crossing	The border-guard spokeswoman's operational update says the crossing is working normally. This is a status time, not the article's first publication time. [09]
13 Sep 12:50 / 14:00 updates	Rail recovery	Suspilne records renewed train movement and, later, an emergency-service report that the locomotive fire was extinguished. The timestamps describe updates, not the moment work finished. [05]
13 Sep 16:21; update 18:15	LIGA clarification	An early account associating the dignitaries with the attacked train is corrected through the YES organiser: their special service was already in Dorohusk. [06]
13 Sep 19:07, displayed	Interfax / operator	The railway's possible-diplomatic-target assessment and advance-warning account are reported together. [04]
13 Sep 17:50 UTC	AP wire account	The agency distinguishes the diplomatic service from Petraeus's separate train and reports no immediate train casualties. ABC carries the press-office aftermath photograph. [03]
13 Sep 22:30 update	Suspilne clarification	The national broadcaster adds the conference organiser's account, expressly crediting LIGA.net. This is propagation of that clarification, not a second interview. [07]
13 Sep 23:25, displayed	English-language operator account	Ukrinform publishes the warning, earlier departure and possible-target claim. [08]

Time convention: Ukrainian outlet times above are retained as displayed. AP's UTC wire timestamp corresponds to 20:50 in Kyiv. Rows with only "morning" are deliberately approximate. This is a selected reporting chronology, not a claim to have located the first social-media upload.

07 / FROM INCIDENT REPORTING TO EUROPEAN RESPONSE



Plate 03 · Response context. Pistorius at the Wolgast shipyard, 14 September. Reuters / Annegret Hilse, via The Star. This is a ministerial-visit photograph, not an incident or suspect image. [17]

The next reporting cycle largely concerns consequences and interpretation.

The date of a reaction article should not be mistaken for the date of the strike. The attack was on Sunday 13 September; the Reuters source article concerns remarks on Monday 14 September.

DATE / TIME	REPORTING STAGE	CONTRIBUTION TO THE RECORD
13 Sep assessment Circulated by 14 Sep	ISW analysis	Publishes a stronger inference that European officials were the intended victims. Its cited evidence remains open-source. [12]
14 Sep 08:52 UTC indexed	Le Monde	Places the incident in the European reaction cycle and reports 206 unharmed train passengers. [18]
14 Sep 11:30 UTC syndication	Reuters / Pistorius	The starting story reports his assessment of a calculated escalation. ThePrint displays its copy at 17:30 IST, a later syndication timestamp. [01] [02] [15]
14 Sep Day, time not fixed	France and NATO	Barrot stresses intimidation and division; Rutte also responds publicly. These reactions show diplomatic significance, not independent knowledge of a drone’s instructions. [14] [20]
14 Sep 15:01, displayed	Local follow-up	Suspilne adds repair and damage information from the district administration. [11]
14 Sep 19:11, displayed	Kremlin response	NV reports Peskov’s statement that operations across Ukraine will continue. AP also carries his response in its rolling report. [13] [19]

Research closes on 15 September 2026. Current article versions may contain later edits than their original timestamps. A publishing date records when a claim was reported, not when it was independently proved.

08 / WHAT THE RECORD DOES—AND DOES NOT—CORROBORATE

The photograph problem

Reuters’ syndicated gallery captions identify a burning train at **Lutsk on 12 September**, another scene at **Kharkiv on 9 September**, and the minister’s visit to **Wolgast on 14 September**. Those are contextual pictures. They should not be relabelled as the Yahodyn locomotive strike. [15]

The Guardian corrected a misassigned train photograph and clarified separate trains on 14 September. [16]

The train problem

A correction based on a named, relevant source deserves more weight than a compressed early headline. Once a service has been identified, that distinction should remain visible in later reporting. More reproductions of an old formulation cannot supply new evidence for it.

CLAIM UNDER REVIEW	ASSESSMENT AND CORROBORATION LIMIT
Locomotive struck	Strongly supported. Direct railway confirmation, published press-office photograph and multiple reports converge. The image’s provenance is institutional, not a separately obtained forensic exhibit. [03] [05]
Visitors on the struck train	Incorrect for the YES service. The organiser’s clarification and the railway’s distinction between trains resolve the confusion. [07] [08]
Diplomatic train selected as target	Unresolved. An operator assessment repeated across outlets is still one underlying assertion. ISW supplies an analysis, not a disclosed targeting record. [08] [12]
Strike inside NATO territory	Not established by these reports. The described impacts are on the Ukrainian side. Proximity to Poland is not evidence of a Polish impact or airspace crossing.
Putin personally ordered this target	Not demonstrated in the starting article. Political attribution should not be silently upgraded into proof of individual operational tasking. [01] [02]

Counting corroboration honestly

Reuters and its syndicated copies form one reporting family. AP and its republications form another. Interfax, Ukrinform and Suspilne sometimes relay the same railway statement. The additional value comes from identifiable new evidence: a direct railway interview, a conference organiser’s clarification, local road witnesses and separately recorded government responses.

Confidence labels are qualitative judgments about the reviewed public record. They are not numerical probabilities, legal findings or claims that every available source was accessible.

09 / SOURCES AND PROVENANCE

Numbered citations link directly to the supporting report. English titles below are descriptive translations or shortened labels. Sources were consulted on 15 September 2026.

- 01 **Reuters** · 14 September 2026
Pistorius calls the train strike a calculated escalation
 The user's starting report. Reuters TV; writing Sabine Siebold. Direct page access was restricted; the text was checked in its Reuters syndication, source 02.
- 02 **Reuters, via ThePrint** · 14 September · 17:30 IST, displayed
Accessible syndication of the starting Reuters report
 Same dispatch as 01, not independent corroboration. Documents the remarks at Wolgast; supplies no supporting intelligence dossier.
- 03 **Associated Press, via ABC News** · 13 September · 17:50 UTC wire timestamp
Russian drone hits train soon after visiting officials left
 Agency reporting, drawing on Ukrzaliznytsia and public statements. Hosts Plate 01, credited to the railway press office via AP. ABC displays 13:50 without an explicit zone.
- 04 **Interfax-Ukraine** · 13 September · 19:07, displayed
Operator describes warning and possible diplomatic target
 Reports the railway's statement, including its jet/mesh description and approximately 15-minute warning. Full Ukrainian text inspected. A report of a primary statement, not a forensic examination.
- 05 **Suspilne Lutsk** · 13 September · updates at 12:50 and 14:00
Direct railway confirmation of the Kyiv–Warsaw locomotive strike
 Original telephone interview with railway deputy director Oleksandr Shevchenko; later operator and emergency-service updates. Times are displayed local reporting times.
- 06 **LIGA.net · Yuliia Kuzmenko** · 13 September · 16:21; substantive update 18:15
Conference organiser clarifies which train was involved
 Original comment from YES communicator Nataliia Vovk corrects the initial account relayed from Spiegel. Current metadata also records a 14 September modification. Hosts Plate 02, credited as a United24 screenshot.
- 07 **Suspilne News** · 13 September · update 22:30
Operator account and the YES organiser's clarification
 Links to Ukrzaliznytsia's post 8485 and repeats LIGA's clarification. These portions share their underlying sources with 04 and 06.
- 08 **Ukrinform** · 13 September · 23:25, displayed
Diplomatic train had been at Yahodyn before the strike
 English rendering of the operator's account, retrieved through indexed article text. Corroborates the wording's publication, not the intent of the attacker independently.
- 09 **Suspilne Lutsk** · 13 September · includes 10:00 status
Fuel station and trucks damaged near Yahodyn
 Original interviews with customs and border-guard spokespeople; correspondent reports two lightly injured drivers. Separates the road site from the railway.
- 10 **Suspilne Lutsk** · 13 September
Drivers describe the roadside strike and damage
 On-scene interviews, including an injured driver, and photographs of the road crater and vehicles. Stronger local evidence than repeated agency summaries of the road incident.

10 / SOURCES AND PROVENANCE, CONTINUED

- 11 **Suspilne Lutsk** · 14 September · 15:01, displayed
Repair work and damage reports after the Volyn attacks
 Telephone interview with district administration head Olha Cheren. Describes road repairs; regional totals cover several sites and both 12 and 13 September.
- 12 **Institute for the Study of War / Critical Threats** · Assessment dated 13 September
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
 Open-source synthesis and an explicit assessment of intent. Links to geolocation work, Ukrainian statements and Russian military claims. It is not a separate eyewitness or classified intelligence source.
- 13 **NV English** · 14 September · 19:11, displayed
Peskov says Russian operations across Ukraine will continue
 Reports the Kremlin spokesman's response to the train question. An account of Russia's public position; it does not authenticate the intended target.
- 14 **Reuters** · 14 September
Barrot says the strike sought to intimidate and divide Europe
 Indexed agency report of France's response at the European Arctic summit in Finland. Political interpretation, not additional incident forensics.
- 15 **Reuters, via Yahoo / AT&T** · 14 September · 11:30 UTC, displayed
Image captions accompanying the starting Reuters dispatch
 Indexed gallery captions identify Lutsk on 12 September, Kharkiv on 9 September and Wolgast on 14 September. None of those three pictures is captioned Yahodyn on 13 September.
- 16 **The Guardian** · 14 September 2026
Correction note
 Inspected directly.
- 17 **Reuters, via The Star** · 14 September · 18:26 MYT
Pistorius at the Wolgast shipyard ceremony
 Separate dispatch on the same ministerial visit. Supplies Plate 03 and its Reuters/Annegret Hilse credit. Used for the photograph's context, not as corroboration of targeting.
- 18 **Le Monde** · 14 September · 08:52 UTC indexed timestamp
International reaction to the strike near Poland
 Independent publication reporting 206 unharmed passengers. Its compressed discussion of dignitaries must be read alongside the more precise train distinctions in 06 and 07.
- 19 **Associated Press, via WSB Radio** · 14 September · 14:26 EDT version
Ukraine, Russia and the response after the border strike
 Rolling AP report by Claudia Ciobanu, Elise Morton and Hanna Arhirova. Independently reports Peskov's response. Headline changed as energy negotiations became the lead story; access varied by retrieval.
- 20 **Suspilne News** · 14 September
Rutte responds to the train attack
 Report of the NATO Secretary General's reaction. Records the response cycle; it cannot establish the operator or command chain of the drone.

Primary-source trails. The operator statement is linked as Ukrzaliznytsia post 8485 by Suspilne and other outlets. Its earlier incident post is 8483. Direct post content was not retrievable in this review; the dossier attributes their substance to the inspected publications rather than claiming direct access.

11 / RESEARCH METHOD AND PRINT DOCTRINE

Scope and limitations

This is a documentary investigation of the publicly reported Yahodyn incidents and the 14 September Reuters reaction story. It combines English-language agency reporting with Ukrainian local reporting and published institutional imagery. Ukrainian text was translated for the analysis; conditional claims remain conditional.

The review does not include interviews conducted by the author, physical access to wreckage, classified intelligence or an independently surveyed impact location. It found no public evidentiary basis to name a launch crew, authenticate a payload or resolve the intended-target question conclusively.

Image register

PLATE	PROVENANCE AND TREATMENT
01 · Locomotive	Ukrzaliznytsia press-office handout via AP / ABC. Downloaded reproduction: 992 × 558 px. Original capture metadata unavailable. [03]
02 · Evacuation	United24 screenshot credited by LIGA.net, 1,062 × 612 px. Existing blur retained. It is a published frame, not a video independently authenticated here. [06]
03 · Pistorius	Reuters / Annegret Hilse via The Star, 450 × 300 px. Labelled response context; displayed at modest size to respect its resolution. [17]

Images retain the retrieved framing and colours. Credits identify their publishers and stated origins; they do not imply ownership or a licence for unrestricted republication. The file embeds the reproductions for this research catalogue. The cover coin was supplied by ISS Global for branding and is not an evidentiary plate.

Questions that would materially change the assessment

An authenticated targeting order or mission record would address intent. Dispatcher logs and complete station footage would clarify the timing. A published forensic inventory could identify the actual device and payload. An investigative finding naming the responsible unit would permit a more specific attribution.

Maps M1–M2 and their source credits are on [page 02](#). Map coordinates identify reference features; exact incident points remain unverified.

A4 production specification

A4 portrait · 210 × 297 mm · 12 mm page margins on all sides · 186 × 273 mm printable area. Each page has an internal running header, ruled footer and explicit folio. Typography, photographs and citations are embedded or linked. A full-page ivory wash and faint ISS Global coin watermark sit behind the content.

Verification: The 13-page PDF passed checks for A4 size, placement of text and content images within the 12 mm margins, all page headers and folios, and body-to-footer clearance. All embedded photographs, map plates and the supplied ISS Global coin decoded correctly. ISS Global appears in every footer. Citation links and internal navigation targets were checked structurally. The wash reaches every paper edge; the watermark remains behind the content. Every rendered page was visually reviewed.

Printing: choose A4 portrait, 100% scale and the document’s CSS margins. Disable the browser’s own headers and footers. The supplied PDF is the verified print master. HTML was rendered with WeasyPrint; Chrome, Safari and Firefox pagination was not separately certified. Enable background graphics. The PDF carries the wash to the paper edge; physical full-bleed printing requires a borderless printer.