

ISS GLOBAL / NOMINATED INCIDENT INVESTIGATION



DIVE-LD AT HORMUZ

Capture, malfunction and the limits of the public evidence

REPORTING / REVIEW WINDOW

Nominated incident · 8 September 2026 loss/recovery · developments reviewed to 4 October 2026

ISSUE DATE

2026-10-04

A corroborated loss of physical custody; a disputed account of how it occurred; an unproven scale of technical exploitation.

Iran displayed a US-operated Anduril Dive-LD after announcing its recovery near Hormuz on 8 September. US and company responses substantiate the loss, while the causal sequence remains unresolved. ^[1] ^[3]

Principal judgement. Confidence is high in platform-family identification and Iranian possession, lower in the exact mechanism, and insufficient to confirm the installed payload or exploitation yield. No exact recovery position is established.

Scope. This retrospective investigation covers the nominated incident and later reporting through 4 October 2026, including Arabic and Persian sources. It treats the later REMUS 600 claim separately. It is not the day's scheduled edition.

01 Location atlas

02 Reconstruction

03 Visual evidence

04 Platform examination

05 Historical comparison

06 Evidence audit

07 Reporting chronology

08 Consequences & Dfuze relevance

01 / LOCATION ATLAS

A strait, not a verified recovery point



Regional plate. Hormuz connects the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman between Iran and Oman. The marker at 56.5°E, 26.6°N is a rounded geographic reference, not a loss coordinate. [12] [13]



Local plate. Public accounts describe the entrance to the strait but do not establish where the vehicle failed, was first approached or was lifted. These may be three different positions. [1] [4] [13]

North is up; WGS84 input coordinates, EPSG:3857 display. Scale bars: 200 km and 25 km, computed from returned map extents and checked independently by geodesic and great-circle calculations. No route, territorial-water boundary or interception point is inferred.

Map reading. The nearby coasts orient the reader. They do not establish which jurisdiction contained the craft, its operating depth, or its distance from a support vessel. This atlas is unsuitable for navigation.

Possession is stronger evidence than mechanism

The minimum defensible reconstruction is a US-operated Dive-LD lost in the region and subsequently displayed in Iranian hands. Reuters obtained both a US malfunction account and Anduril’s acknowledgement of loss. Neither response supplies a failure log or exact position. ^[1]

Iran’s published account assigns the operation to the IRGC Navy and places it at dawn on 8 September near the strait entrance. Early English reporting initially lacked US confirmation; that is a reporting-stage limitation, not a continuing contradiction after later responses. ^{[5] [7]}

STAGE	EVIDENCE BASIS	WHAT REMAINS OPEN
Before recovery	US account: malfunction more than a day before the announcement. ^[1]	Failure mode, precise time, telemetry and recovery decision.
Approach and recovery	Iranian operational claim; released lifting imagery. ^{[2] [4]}	Whether the craft was already drifting or disabled, and whether any coercive action occurred.
Identification	Dive-LD marking and form; company acknowledgement. ^{[2] [3]}	Serial number, build standard and exact fitted payload.
After recovery	23 September statement claims reverse engineering. ^[6]	Access achieved, information obtained, functioning replica or deployed derivative.

ISS Global assessment. A malfunction followed by opportunistic recovery is compatible with the visible evidence. A deliberate interception also cannot be excluded solely from the photographs. The accounts are not entirely mutually exclusive: an organised recovery operation can retrieve a previously failed vehicle. The missing causal evidence is the interval between normal operation and first Iranian contact.

A Janes account separately notes an Iranian 6 September claim about attacking an unmanned submarine, without an established connection to this recovery. Combining the two would create a sequence the sources do not prove. ^[3]

03 / VISUAL EVIDENCE

Three published views of the recovered vehicle



Plate A. Top-down view published with the 8 September incident reporting; Iranian quasi-state media via The War Zone. Hull and upper structures are visible. Recording location and original timestamp are unverified. ^[2]



Plate B. Published lifting view from the same source family. Handling equipment and a largely intact exterior are visible; the frame does not record an interception or reveal internal condition. ^[2]



Plate C. Marking close-up from the same release family. Partial lettering is consistent with Dive-LD; it is not a unique serial identifier. Credit: Iranian quasi-state media via The War Zone. ^[2]

Image observations. These are publisher-associated incident images, not independently geolocated originals. Multiple angles increase confidence in the object's exterior appearance but do not create multiple independent witnesses. No payload bay contents, mission files or verified component inventory are shown.

Advertised capability versus captured configuration

Dive-LD is an autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV), within the broader UUV category. It should not be entered as an aerial UAS. The historical manufacturer sheet describes a modular survey-capable platform; the captured configuration must remain a separate object record. ^[8]

HISTORICAL PUBLISHED PARAMETER	VALUE / QUALIFICATION
Overall dimensions / mass	5.8 m × 1.2 m; 2,700 kg in the 2022 sheet.
Rated depth / speed	Up to 6,000 m; 2–8 knots. Neither is the incident depth or speed.
Endurance	Four days at 4 knots with SAS survey; ten days at 2.5 knots without payload. “Ten days” is not unconditional.
Energy / payload space	93 kWh and over 1 m³ in that published configuration.
Payload examples	Sonars, magnetometer and cameras are listed options, not a recovered inventory.

All table values are historical advertised data. They do not demonstrate the captured craft’s battery capacity, performance, sensor suite or software version. ^[8]

Sonardyne’s supplier account describes acoustic-inertial navigation development, including SPRINT-Nav X and AvTrak 6 integration. It also describes shallow-water trials with Micro-Ranger 2. This substantiates a development architecture, not those components’ presence aboard this particular hull. ^[9]

Payload finding. The reviewed incident evidence does not establish an explosive charge, mine, torpedo or weapon-release mission. A platform’s possible military applications cannot be substituted for a fitted payload manifest. Equally, the US description of a non-classified configuration is an official claim, not a public forensic examination. ^[1]

Public document for examination. The two-page 2022 Anduril Dive-LD product sheet is linked directly. Both pages were inspected. The current manufacturer page was JavaScript-blocked in this research session. ^[8] ^[15]

A documented US Navy type reference



Plate D. US Navy personnel train with Dive-LD at Keyport, Washington, on 11 December 2024. Photo: Loren Nichols / US Navy, DVIDS 8950379; published 2 April 2025. Historical comparison only: this is not proof of the captured vehicle’s serial number or equipment. ^[10]

The Navy’s own visual record establishes hands-on training before the April 2025 delivery milestone cited in subsequent reporting. Training, formal delivery and operational deployment are different events; none should be silently substituted for the date of manufacture. ^[10] ^[3]

ISS Global visual comparison. The historical reference supports recognition of the broad hull form and handling scale. Colour, lettering and external fittings can change between units. A positive serial-level match would require manufacturer records or an unambiguous unique identifier, not a silhouette alone.

COMPARISON QUESTION	CONCLUSION
Same platform family?	Strong support when visual resemblance is combined with manufacturer acknowledgement.
Same vehicle as the Navy training photograph?	Not established.
Same payload or navigation fit?	Not established.
Proof of damage or defeat method?	Neither the historical image nor the released exterior views resolves it.

Confidence must attach to individual claims

PROPOSITION	STATUS	REASON / NEXT EVIDENCE
Iran obtained a Dive-LD	High confidence	Company acknowledgement and adversary imagery converge. ^[1] ^[2]
The craft malfunctioned first	US account; plausible, unverified mechanism	No public telemetry or failure investigation. ^[4]
IRGC caused the failure	Not established	Recovery and causation are different propositions.
Sensitive technology was absent	US assurance	No public inventory or forensic access validates scope. ^[1]
Iran is studying the vehicle	Reported Iranian claim	Tasnim quotes a reverse-engineering assertion; no technical results. ^[6]
A functional copy has been produced	Unsupported in reviewed evidence	Would require demonstrated performance and provenance.
A specific recovery coordinate is known	Unsupported	Public wording is regional, not geolocation.

Independence. Reuters, specialist outlets and Arabic reporting provide separate journalistic access, but repeated quotations of the same spokesperson remain one underlying institutional account. Iranian photographs are one release family even when many websites reproduce them. Manufacturer recognition is more useful for model identity than for independently explaining the malfunction.

Competing hypotheses. Technical failure followed by recovery; external interference contributing to failure; or a mixed sequence involving both. The present record does not permit a numerical probability ranking. Evidence capable of discriminating among them includes authenticated time-stamped health logs, control-state changes, communications history and continuous recovery footage.

Age language. “Older model” and a recent delivery milestone are not necessarily incompatible. One describes configuration or generation; the other describes a procurement event. No build record establishes the age of this specific vehicle. ^[3]

Scope of uncertainty. Absence of a public exhibit is not proof that an exhibit does not exist. It limits this open-source report’s conclusions; it does not resolve classified or unpublished findings.

Event dates and publication dates kept apart

PUBLICATION / EVENT	WHAT ENTERED THE RECORD	QUALIFICATION
11 Dec 2024 / posted 2 Apr 2025	Navy training photograph. ^[10]	Historical type reference.
Before 8 Sep 2026	US says failure preceded announcement by more than a day. ^[1]	Relative interval only; exact failure time unknown.
8 Sep, claimed dawn	IRGC recovery/interception narrative. ^[4]	Claimed event time, not independently timed footage.
8 Sep, 16:22 BST	Iran International publishes early seizure account. ^[5]	Initial lack of US response later superseded.
8 Sep US evening / 9 Sep UTC	Specialist and wire accounts add US and company responses. ^{[1] [2]}	Date difference reflects publication/time zone.
9 Sep	Founder’s account of months of operational use reported by Janes. ^[3]	Operating history asserted; logs not public.
23 Sep / 1 Mehr 1405	Tasnim reports reverse-engineering claim. ^[6]	Claim of activity, not evidence of success.
27 Sep	Separate REMUS 600 capture claim in Arabic reporting. ^[11]	Different named platform; kept out of Dive-LD count.
4 Oct	ISS Global nominated-incident review.	Research cutoff; not a new capture date.

Language handling. Arabic and Persian pages were read in their original languages and translated for this English report. The Persian dates 17 Shahrivar and 1 Mehr 1405 correspond to 8 and 23 September 2026. The later claim’s present-tense wording describes an asserted process, not a completed engineering outcome. ^{[6] [7]}

Al Jazeera’s 27 September article names REMUS 600 and attributes an electronic-warfare account to Iran. That assertion is not evidence of how the Dive-LD was lost. Keeping model, date and source family separate prevents a false composite incident. ^[11]

Material loss, uncertain exploitation yield

The strait’s strategic importance is independently grounded: EIA places it between Oman and Iran and records approximately 20 million barrels per day of oil transit in 2024. This is a historical scale reference; it is not an estimate of flow during the recovery or in October 2026. ^[12]

ISS Global assessment. Three consequences should be distinguished. The operator lost physical custody of a vehicle. The possessor gained an opportunity to inspect it. The public display created a narrative opportunity. Only the first is directly established by the converging accounts; the magnitude of technical and operational advantage remains unmeasured.

“Attributable” describes an accepted possibility of loss in the manufacturer’s account. It does not establish that replacement is costless, that every installed item is expendable, or that all information exposure has been eliminated. Nor does an intact exterior prove accessible software, usable credentials or a reproducible manufacturing process. ^[1]

INVESTIGATIVE WORKSTREAM	REQUIRED DISTINCTION
Physical exploitation	Visible hull features versus verified internal inventory.
Digital exposure	Data physically present versus readable, authentic and operationally valuable.
Engineering replication	Inspection opportunity versus tested equivalent performance.
Mission impact	Single asset loss versus quantified coverage gap or operation failure.
Narrative assessment	Official claim, independently confirmed fact and analyst judgement.

Dfuze relevance. Model this as an incident linked to an object, several media exhibits, institutional statements and separate technical references. Attach provenance, capture-time uncertainty and source family to each exhibit. Preserve the claimed failure and claimed interception as competing relationships. Do not overwrite one with the other when a new article arrives.

Priority collection. Seek an official loss investigation, serial/configuration confirmation, a payload inventory, authenticated recovery metadata and independently testable exploitation findings. These would change the assessment more than additional reposts of the same images.

Editorial conclusion. This case supports a concrete lesson in custody and evidence discipline for autonomous systems. It does not demonstrate a general defeat of underwater autonomy, an established electronic-warfare method, or successful replication of the captured technology.

SOURCE REGISTER

Sources 01–05

Source families and access limits are recorded below. Repetition of a statement is not independent proof.

-
- 01 **Iran says it captured US submarine drone in Strait of Hormuz**
Reuters via Al-Monitor · Wire dated 8 September; host published 9 September 2026
Family: Reuters wire; US and company statements · Accessed 4 October 2026. Full syndication read; original Reuters URL failed. Syndications count as one family. Statements are attributed, not independently inspected logs.
Open original source | www.al-monitor.com
-
- 02 **Everything We Know About the US Navy's Submersible Drone Iran Just Captured**
The War Zone / Joseph Trevithick · 8 September 2026, 20:26 EDT
Family: Specialist reporting; direct responses; Iranian handout imagery · Accessed 4 October 2026. Full article and three images reviewed. Original capture metadata and location are unavailable; same handout family across outlets.
Open original source | www.twz.com
-
- 03 **Anduril confirms Iran captured UUV**
Janes · September 2026; exact publication date not visible in retrieved page
Family: Specialist reporting; founder statement · Accessed 4 October 2026. Accessible article reviewed. Search age label conflicted with article chronology and was disregarded. Founder post is reported second-hand.
Open original source | www.janes.com
-
- 04 **IRGC announces seizure of an American uncrewed submarine at Hormuz [translated title]**
Al Jazeera Arabic · 8 September 2026
Family: Arabic reporting; IRGC statement, direct CENTCOM response and agencies · Accessed 4 October 2026. Arabic text read and translated by ISS Global. The page credits Al Jazeera, AFP and Reuters; overlapping claims are not independent event proof.
Open original source | www.aljazeera.net
-
- 05 **IRGC says it captured advanced US underwater drone near Hormuz**
Iran International · 8 September 2026, 16:22 BST
Family: Early claim reporting · Accessed 4 October 2026. Relevant article read, excluding unrelated feed content appended below it. Its absence of immediate US confirmation describes that publication stage only.
Open original source | www.iranintl.com
-

SOURCE REGISTER

Sources 06–10

Source families and access limits are recorded below. Repetition of a statement is not independent proof.

-
- 06 US smart submarine is being reverse-engineered [translated title]
Tasnim, Persian · 1 Mehr 1405 / 23 September 2026, 17:08 local publisher time
Family: Iranian political statement · Accessed 4 October 2026. Full Persian text read and translated by ISS Global. Reports Mohsen Rezaei's assertion; no teardown, test or replication evidence accompanies it.
Open original source | www.tasnimnews.ir
-
- 07 Dive-LD: the smart vehicle the IRGC caught in Hormuz [translated title]
Tasnim, Persian · 17 Shahrivar 1405 / 8 September 2026
Family: Iranian narrative and platform description · Accessed 4 October 2026. Linked page and dated title retrieved; incident wording corroborated against the later Tasnim article. Not used as independent technical verification.
Open original source | tasnimnews.ir
-
- 08 DIVE-LD product sheet, 2022 Australian edition
Anduril; hosted by Second Line of Defense · 2022; exact issue day not stated
Family: Primary manufacturer document on third-party host · Accessed 4 October 2026. Both PDF pages read and visually inspected. Historical advertised configuration; not an as-built record of the lost vehicle. Direct public PDF link provided for examination.
Open original source | sldinfo.com
-
- 09 Long-endurance AUV development with shallow water simplicity
Sonardyne · Undated case study
Family: Primary technical supplier case study · Accessed 4 October 2026. Full text read. Describes development integration, not serial-specific equipment on the captured craft. Commercial source with product interests.
Open original source | www.sonardyne.com
-
- 10 Unmanned Undersea Vehicle Group 1 Sailors Train with Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicle
US Navy / DVIDS · Taken 11 December 2024; posted 2 April 2025
Family: Primary Navy visual record · Accessed 4 October 2026. Image 8950379, VIRIN 241211-N-HJ901-1001, Loren Nichols. Public domain subject to DVIDS restrictions. Historical type comparison, not the captured serial.
Open original source | www.dvidshub.net
-

SOURCE REGISTER

Sources 11–15

Source families and access limits are recorded below. Repetition of a statement is not independent proof.

-
- 11 **IRGC announces control of an American uncrewed submarine in Hormuz [translated title]**
Al Jazeera Arabic · 27 September 2026; updated 17:49 Mecca
Family: Separate REMUS 600 claim; Iranian statement via agencies · Accessed 4 October 2026. Arabic full text read and translated. It names REMUS 600, not Dive-LD. Its electronic-warfare allegation is not transferred to the 8 September case.
Open original source | www.aljazeera.net
-
- 12 **Amid regional conflict, the Strait of Hormuz remains critical oil chokepoint**
US Energy Information Administration · 16 June 2025
Family: Primary geographic and historical energy context · Accessed 4 October 2026. Full text reviewed. 2024 flows are a historical baseline, not current October 2026 traffic. Location checked against the map.
Open original source | www.eia.gov
-
- 13 **World Topographic Map static export service**
Esri ArcGIS Online · Map exports acquired 4 October 2026
Family: Geographic basemap · Accessed 4 October 2026. Returned extent, projection, provider attribution and independent scale calculations retained. Maps show context; no recovered-vehicle coordinate exists in this evidence set.
Open original source | services.arcgisonline.com
-
- 14 **Data attributions and terms of use**
Esri · Accessed 4 October 2026
Family: Provider terms and attribution · Accessed 4 October 2026. Provider legal page reviewed; map credits retained. Two static report plates, not a bulk tile archive or navigational product.
Open original source | www.esri.com
-
- 15 **Dive-LD product page**
Anduril · Accessed 4 October 2026
Family: Manufacturer website; access limitation · Accessed 4 October 2026. The current page returned a JavaScript requirement. No unseen current specification is asserted; historical primary sheet and supplier account support the bounded technical comparison.
Open original source | www.anduril.com
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